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Asymmetric war of attrition
Evolutionary game theoryThe war of attrition in game theory is a model of a stand-off situation between two opponents where the
winner is determined by its persistence. We model a stand-off between a predator and a prey when the
prey is hiding and the predator is waiting for the prey to come out from its refuge, or when the two are
locked in a situation of mutual threat of injury or even death. The stand-off is resolved when the predator
gives up or when the prey tries to escape. Instead of using the asymmetric war of attrition, we embed the
stand-off as an integral part of the predator–prey model of Rosenzweig and MacArthur derived from first
principles. We apply this model to study the coevolution of the giving-up rates of the prey and the preda-
tor, using the adaptive dynamics approach. We find that the long term evolutionary process leads to three
qualitatively different scenarios: the predator gives up immediately, while the prey never gives up; the
predator never gives up, while the prey adopts any giving-up rate greater than or equal to a given positive
threshold value; the predator goes extinct. We observe that some results are the same as for the asym-
metric war of attrition, but others are quite different.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The war of attrition in game theory is a model of a stand-off sit-
uation between two opponents where the winner is determined by
its persistence. In the symmetric version of the game, where the
costs and benefits for two equally matched opponents are the
same, the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is stochastic and
given by a negative exponential probability distribution for the
length of time till giving-up if the cost of waiting is a linear func-
tion of time (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Bishop and
Cannings, 1978; Maynard Smith, 1982). The exponential distribu-
tion is equivalent to both players adopting the same constant
giving-up rate and the average pay-off for each player turns out
to be zero.
In the asymmetric version of the game, where the opponents
assume different unambiguous roles like ‘‘owner” and ‘‘intruder”
or ‘‘prey” and ‘‘predator”, there is no ESS under complete informa-
tion, but a Nash equilibrium where one player gives up immedi-
ately while the other player can choose any giving-up time above
a certain threshold value (Selten, 1980). This neutrality of strat-
egy choice for the second player can be resolved if the game is
even slightly perturbed, e.g., by introducing the possibility ofplayers making errors in the role identification (Hammerstein
and Parker, 1982; Kim, 1993). In some cases, however, errors
are unlikely, such as with a stand-off between a predator and
its prey.
In this paper, we study a stand-off between a predator and its
prey, e.g., when the prey is hiding and the predator is waiting for
the prey to come out, or more dramatically, when they are locked
in a situation of mutual threat of injury or even death by the preda-
tor’s teeth and claws or the horns and hooves of the prey. The
stand-off is resolved when the predator gives up or when the prey
tries to escape. More specifically, the predator may give up the
prey, which could then escape and survive the attack, or, the prey
may have to eventually give up and, as a consequence, be killed by
the predator with a certain probability.
This behaviour is widely present in nature, as different anti-
predator strategies have been observed in prey species upon
encounter with a predator in order to maximise survival or, on
the other side, some predator species use predatory strategies to
lure the prey (Endler, 1991). Examples are the use of deterrent sig-
nals (Fitzgibbon and Fanshawe, 1988; Favreau et al., 2010), dei-
matic behaviour (Stevens, 2005; Vallin et al., 2005; Ratcliffe and
Fullard, 2005; Langridge et al., 2007), playing dead (Alboni et al.,
2008), physical and chemical features (Vincent and Owers, 1986;
Maan and Cummings, 2012).
Studies on the ecology of fear include the works by Brown
(1999) and Brown and Kotler (2007), investigating the adaptive
behaviour of foragers in order to minimise the cost of predation
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vigilance; the experimental works by Katz et al. (2010, 2013),
which focus on the cost and benefits of the waiting game in the lit-
tle egret-goldfish dynamics; finally, we cite the articles by Křivan
(1997, 2007), using the Lotka-Volterra system to model the adap-
tive behaviour of a predator and its prey when the two maximise
their fitness by adapting to the other player’s strategy or by habitat
selection.
Instead of using the asymmetric war of attrition, we embed the
stand-off as an integral part of the predator–prey model of
Rosenzweig and MacArthur (1963) derived from first principles.
We use the mechanistic method described by Berardo et al.
(2020) to derive a predator functional response similar to a Holling
type II, where the effective attack rate and effective handling time
are interpretable functions of the underlying individual dynamics
rates. In this way, the event rates describing individual birth and
death, prey capture and prey handling, the formation and break-
up of a predator–prey pair in a mutual stand-off, they all become
explicit parameters of the population model. The costs and benefits
of victory or defeat during a stand-off remain implicit as part of the
population dynamics, but eventually they come down to births and
deaths gained or lost.
In this context, we study the coevolution of the giving-up
rates of the predator and the prey using the adaptive dynamics
approach (Metz et al., 1995; Geritz et al., 1997, 1998, 1999).
As a consequence, our emphasis is somewhat different than
in evolutionary game theory. In particular, we focus on the
evolutionary dynamics and local stability assuming small muta-
tion steps.
As we consider the predator and the prey locked together in
the stand-off, our study differs also from the previous works by
Geritz and Gyllenberg (2014) and Lehtinen and Geritz (2019b,a)
on evolution of prey timidity as measured by the rates of individ-
ual prey entering and leaving a refuge or aggressive defensive
posture.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we derive the
population equations for the ecological dynamics and the corre-
sponding equilibria. In Section 3, we introduce the adaptive
dynamics framework in the current context and, in Section 4,
we study the coevolution of the predator and prey giving up
rates. In particular, first we discuss the possible evolutionary
phase planes in Section 4.1 and later, in Section 4.2, we use the
canonical equation of adaptive dynamics to understand the direc-
tion of evolution.Table 1
List of model variables, parameters and functions.
Symbol Description
xFi foraging prey type i
ySj searching predators type j
yHj handling predators type j
Pij pair of predator type j and prey type i
xi total prey density type i
yi total predator density type j
p encounter rate of predator and prey
si giving-up rate of prey type i
qj giving-up rate of predator type j
m 2 0;1½  probability to capture the foraging prey
h 2 0;1½  probability to capture the prey when it gives up
r prey growth rate
d predator death rate
h time spent handling the prey
f ij xð Þ multi-type predator functional response2. Ecological dynamics
We model the scenario where a predator and a prey species
interact in the following way. A searching predator (yS) finds
and attacks a foraging prey (xF) at a rate p, and with probability
m the prey is captured and killed, while the predator enters the
handling state (yH) which includes eating, digesting, resting and
giving birth. With the complementary probability 1 m the two
individuals enter a stand-off state (P) where the prey may hide
in a refuge or show a high level of alertness or aggressiveness.
At the same time the predator does not give up the prey but
waits a favourable time for attacking. The stand-off is resolved
with rate q when the predator gives up, or with rate s when
the prey tries to escape. We name s and q the giving-up rates
of, respectively, the prey and the predator. With probability
1 h the prey successfully escapes and with the complementary
probability h it is captured and killed after all.
The above narration can be summarised with the following fast
processes (see also Table 1 for the complete list of model variables
and parameters):2
Consider n predator types and m prey types. The predators type
j with density yj differ in their giving-up rates qj and in the same
way the prey type i with density xi and different giving-up rates
si. We define with Pij the density of pairs with predator type j
and prey type i. From the individual processes we derive the differ-


































_Pij ¼ 1 mð ÞpxFi ySj  qj þ si
 
Pij; ð4Þ
with conservation laws for the total predator densities




and for the total prey densities




Since birth and death are slow processes, on the fast time-scale
the total predator densities yj for each type j are constant, i.e.
_ySj þ _yHj þ
P
i0








siPij0 ¼ 0: ð7Þ
In order to achieve this, we assume that the predator densities





j ; Pij  xi; xFi for all i; j, so that in the extreme case _xi ¼ 0
and xFi ¼ xi (see Berardo et al., 2020 and Appendix A for details
on the time-scale separation method).
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type i is given by the average number of prey type i caught per
predator type j per unit of time, i.e.
f ij ¼
mpySj xFi þ hsiPij
yj
; ð8Þ
with ySj ; x
F
i and Pij at the fast time equilibrium. Therefore, by substi-
tuting with the unique equilibrium of the fast dynamics (see (A.21),
(A.22) and (A.23) in Appendix A), we get
f ij ¼
mpxi þ hsi 1 mð Þ pqjþsi xi
1þ hpPi0xi0 þ p m 1ð Þ hqj  1 Pi0 xi0qjþsi0 þ h 1 hð ÞPi0 si0 xi0qjþsi0
h i :
ð9Þ









mqj þ si hþ m hmð Þ
 
; ð11Þ
hij ¼ hþ 1 mmqj þ si hþ m hmð Þ
: ð12Þ
If only one prey type x with strategy s and one predator type y
with strategy q are present, then the functional response becomes








qþ s mqþ s hþ m hmð Þ½ ; ð14Þ
hs;q ¼ hþ 1 mmqþ s hþ m hmð Þ ð15Þ
are the effective capture rate and handling time, respectively.
The functional response in (13) is a Holling type II functional
response. The average time spent handling after the capture is h
and the predator enters the handling state in two cases: with prob-
ability p qqþs m, a predator gives up stalking the prey and the same
prey is captured after a new encounter; with probability
p sqþs hþ m hmð Þ, the prey gives up hiding from the predator and
is caught either after escaping or after a new encounter with a
predator. These probabilities define the capture rate bs;q in (13).
On the other hand, the encounter and no capture after stalking
happens with probability p 1 mð Þ and the time spent in the
stand-off by the pair is 1qþs, therefore, when we multiply the capture
rate bs;q by the second term 1mmqþs hþmhmð Þ in the handling time hs;q, we
get p 1mð Þqþs .
Note that when we take the limit for m to 1, the prey and preda-
tor never enter the stand-off state and the predator attacks are suc-
cessful with rate p. When this is the case, we obtain the classical
version of the Holling type II functional response
f xð Þ ¼ px
1þ phx : ð16Þ
For the total population dynamics on the slow time-scale we
consider a multi-type version of the Rosenzweig–MacArthur model
and functional response f ij in (9). The equations for the prey of type
i and strategy si and the predators of type j and strategy qj are3












f i0 j xð Þyj  dyj: ð18Þ
We use the dimensionless quantities
~xi ¼ xiK ; ~yj ¼
yj
K ;
~t ¼ rt; ~c ¼ Kcr ; ~d ¼ dr ; ~bij ¼
Kbij
r ;
~hij ¼ rhij and drop the
tildes to obtain
















1þPi0bi0 jhi0 jxi0 yj  dyj: ð20Þ
When only a single predator with strategy q and a single prey
with strategy s are present, the system is multi-species
Rosenzweig and MacArthur, 1963 model and the outcomes for
the ecological dynamics are well-known (see Appendix B for
details on the bifurcation analysis). The interior equilibrium
x̂; ŷð Þ ¼ d
cbsq  dbsqhsq
;






is unique and positive if
c dhsq > 0; bsq c dhsq
 
> d: ð22Þ
The steady state is asymptotically stable if the slope of the prey
zero-growth isocline is negative (Fig. 1, Case 3), that is if
cþ dh2sqbsq þ hsq d cbsq
 
> 0: ð23Þ
When the interior equilibrium changes its stability, a Hopf
bifurcation occurs and the system converges to a stable limit cycle
(Fig. 1, Case 2). In case of non-viability of the interior equilibrium,
the predator-free equilibrium is the global attractor of the ecolog-
ical dynamics (Fig. 1, Case 1).3. Adaptive dynamics
We investigate the coevolution of the rates s and q at which
respectively the prey and the predator quit the stand-off state P.
The strategy of both the prey and the predator is a giving-up
rate, which is a continuous trait that could take any non-
negative value. We use the mathematical framework of adaptive
dynamics to understand how the traits evolve and whether coex-
istence of multiple strategies is favoured by natural selection.
We refer to Metz et al., 1992; Geritz et al., 1997 and Geritz
et al., 1998 for the definitions of invasion fitness and selection
gradient.
We rewrite the ecological dynamics in Eqs. (19) and (20) in
terms of the resident environment E
_xi ¼ Gprey si; qj; E
 
xi; ð24Þ
_yj ¼ Gpred si; qj; E
 
yj; ð25Þ





1þPi0bi0 jhi0 jxi0 ; ð26Þ
epredj ¼
yj
1þPi0bi0 jhi0 jxi0 ; ð27Þ
ei ¼ xi: ð28Þ
The instantaneous per capita growth rates Gprey and Gpred of
respectively the prey and the predator are
Fig. 1. Phase plane analysis. Case 1: the interior equilibrium is non-positive and the system converges to the predator-free equilibrium; Case 2: the interior equilibrium is
positive but unstable and the system converges to a stable limit cycle, while the predator-free equilibrium is unstable; Case 3: convergence to the positive and stable interior
equilibrium, while the predator-free equilibrium is unstable.
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Gpred si; qj; E




i0  d: ð30Þ
When the environment settled by the monomorphic resident
types with strategies s and q is at the equilibrium, the invasion fit-
ness of a mutant prey with strategy sm is given by the long-term
average population growth rate





Gprey sm; q; E tð Þð Þdt: ð31Þ
Similarly, when a mutant predator type with strategy qm
invades the resident dynamics, its invasion fitness is defined by





Gpred s; qm; E tð Þð Þdt: ð32Þ
The sign of the invasion fitness decides whether or not a mutant
strategy can invade the resident environment and, in case of con-
vergence to the interior equilibrium, the growth rates of the preda-
tor and the prey fully determine the outcome of the invasion. By
definition, the invasion fitness verifies gprey s; s; qð Þ ¼ 0 and
gpred q; s; qð Þ ¼ 0 at the ecological equilibrium. Otherwise, when
the resident dynamics converges to the periodic attractor, we
time-average the population growth rate over the length of the
limit cycle with period ts;q





Gprey sm; q; E tð Þð Þdt; ð33Þ





Gpred s; qm; E tð Þð Þdt: ð34Þ
The direction of the evolution is defined by the sign of the selec-
tion gradient, i.e. the fitness derivative with respect to the mutant
trait and evaluated at the resident strategy. Here, we derivate the
fitness of the prey with respect to the mutant strategy sm and sim-
ilarly for the predator. The final result for the selection gradient of
respectively the prey and the predator is
@gprey sm; s; qð Þ
@sm
jsm¼s ð35Þ
@gpred qm; s; qð Þ
@qm
jqm¼q ð36Þ
Analogously to the invasion fitness, the selection gradient in a
cycling resident population is defined by the time-average of the
expressions in (35) and (36) over the length of the limit cycle.4
A singular strategy is a pair of values s; qð Þ for the coevolving
strategies s and q such that it is an intersection point for the
isoclines
@gprey sm ;s;qð Þ
@sm
jsm¼s¼s ;q¼q ¼ 0;
@gpred qm ;s;qð Þ
@qm
jqm¼q¼q ;s¼s ¼ 0: ð37Þ
When the singularity s; qð Þ is a local maximum of the invasion
fitness, that is the second derivatives
@2gprey sm ;s;qð Þ
@s2m
jsm¼s¼s ;q¼q < 0;
@2gpred sm ;s;qð Þ
@q2m
jqm¼q¼q ;s¼s < 0; ð38Þ
then the evolutionary singular strategy cannot be invaded by any
mutant prey or predator trait (see the definition of ESS by
Maynard Smith (1982), later extended to asymmetric games and
coevolutionary ESS, for example see Vincent and Brown (1988)).
Conditions for s; qð Þ to be an evolutionary attractor are given in
Appendix D.
A boundary attractor s;0ð Þ satisfies
@gprey sm ;s;qð Þ
@sm
jsm¼s¼s ;q¼q ¼ 0;
@gpred qm ;s;qð Þ
@qm
jqm¼q¼q ;s¼s < 0; ð39Þ
and similarly for 0; qð Þ.
The canonical equation of adaptive dynamics (see Dieckmann
and Law, 1996; Champagnat et al., 2001) describes the rate of
change of the traits s for the prey and q for the predator with the
following relations
_s ¼ kprey s; qð Þ
@gprey sm; qð Þ
@sm
jsm¼s; ð40Þ
_q ¼ kpred s; qð Þ
@gpred s; qmð Þ
@qm
jqm¼q ð41Þ
where kprey s; qð Þ and kpred s; qð Þ are scaling non-negative coefficients
rather difficult to derive and which take into account the influence
of mutation. In particular, kprey s; qð Þ ¼ 12lprey sð Þr2prey sð ÞxE s; qð Þ, where
lprey sð Þ is the mutation probability per birth event, r2prey sð Þ is the
variance of the mutation step distribution and xE s; qð Þ the effective
population size (the resident equilibrium population size if we
assume the resident population at equilibrium). The same definition
holds for kpred s; qð Þ ¼ 12lpred qð Þr2pred qð ÞyE s; qð Þ.
We refer to the works by Ripa and Dieckmann (2013) and Metz
et al. (2016) for the extension of the canonical equation to a peri-
odic environment. In particular, the drifts given by Ripa and
Dieckmann (2013) differ of a factor 12 from the original canonical
equations by Dieckmann and Law (1996), as this is embedded into
the definitions for the effective population sizes: the coefficient for
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similarly for the predator trait, kpred s; qð Þ ¼ lpred qð Þr2pred qð ÞyE s; qð Þ.
In the expressions for kprey s; qð Þ and kpred s; qð Þ, the terms lprey sð Þ
and r2prey sð Þ;lpred qð Þ and r2pred qð Þ are additional model parameters
and do not follow from the population dynamics. Conversely, we
define the effective population densities with the following ratios
between time averages over one complete population cycle
xE s; qð Þ ¼
R ts;q










yE s; qð Þ ¼
R ts;q










The terms bprey and bpred are the explicit birth terms in the prey
and predator equations, while dprey and dpred refer to the corre-
sponding death terms. In the same way, the selection gradients
in Eqs. (40) and (41) are averaged over the length of the limit cycle.
4. Predator–prey coevolution
4.1. Evolutionary dynamics: invasion fitness and selection gradient
We assume that the resident prey and predator populations are
monomorphic most of the time. When an invasion occurs, the
mutant population is sufficiently rare compared to the resident
species and we can apply time-scale separation between the eco-
logical dynamics on the fast time-scale and the evolutionary
dynamics on the slow time-scale. Therefore, we assume that the
resident population has attained an ecologically stable attractor
when the mutant comes along. After invasion, the population
evolves towards an evolutionary attractor through a sequence of
trait substitutions. During the process of directional evolution,
the population remains monomorphic except for the infinitely
short time straight after invasion.
We suppose the monomorphic prey population with strategy s
and the monomorphic predator population with strategy q. The
analytical results collected below are displayed in the s; qð Þ-
planes of Figs. 2 and 3.
The invasion fitness of a mutant prey with strategy sm in the
constant environment defined by the resident populations is




with x̂; ŷð Þ as defined in (21), bs;q and hs;q as defined for (13) and
bsm ;q ¼
p
qþ sm mqþ sm hþ m hmð Þ½ : ð45Þ
Note that bsm ;q is the only factor depending on the mutant trait
sm, as the ratio ŷ1þbs;qhs;qx̂ represents the fraction of resident searching
predators to which the mutant prey is subjected.
Similarly, the invasion fitness for a mutant predator with strat-
egy qm is given by








mqm þ s hþ m hmð Þ½ ; ð47Þ
hs;qm ¼
1 m
mqm þ s hþ m hmð Þ
þ h: ð48Þ
The evolutionary change is determined by the selection gradi-
ent. The selection gradient for the values of trait s is given by the5
derivative of the invasion fitness (44) with respect to sm evaluated
at s ¼ sm,












In the same way, we define the gradient with respect to qm as
@gpred qm; s; qð Þ
@qm
jqm¼q ¼
pc 1 mð Þ pmx̂ shð Þ
qþ sþ px̂ 1 mþ hqmþ hs hþ m hmð Þð Þ½ 2
:
ð50Þ
The unique predator isocline follows from dgpred s; qð Þ ¼ 0 and is
the vertical line
s ¼ d
c dhð Þh : ð51Þ
By imposing dgprey s; qð Þ ¼ 0, we obtain the prey isoclines
q1 ¼ 0; ð52Þ
q2 ¼
dp m 1 hs hþ m hmð Þ½   dsþ cps hþ m hmð Þ
dhmpþ d cmp : ð53Þ
Note that the prey isocline q2 is a straight line with slope
p cdhð Þ hþmhmð Þd
dhmpþdcmp and intersects the horizontal axis at
s ¼ d 1mð Þpp cdhð Þ hþmhmð Þd. It coincides with the extinction boundary for the
ecological dynamics where a transcritical bifurcation occurs and
the interior equilibrium interchanges its stability with the
predator-free equilibrium (see Appendix B). Furthermore, when
c > dh and p ¼ dcdhð Þm, the prey isocline coincides with the vertical
predator isocline. When c > dh and dcdhð Þ hþmhmð Þ < p <
d
cdhð Þm, the
slope of the prey isocline is positive and viceversa for p > dcdhð Þm.
The same conditions can be given also in terms of the parameters
m and h.
The intersection of the isoclines (51) and (52) gives the unique
singular point s; qð Þ ¼ dcdhð Þh ; 0
 	
(with respect to both traits s and
q) when the ecological dynamics attains its interior equilibrium. In
particular, s is positive if and only if c > dh.
As ŷ1þbs;qhs;qx̂ > 0, the sign of prey gradient is only determined by
the ratio pqh 1mð Þ
qþsð Þ2 in (49), that is always negative for m 2 0;1½ Þ. Sim-
ilarly, we study the sign of the predator gradient which depends
only on the factor pmx̂ shð Þ in (50), since 1 m > 0 and the
denominator is always positive. Therefore, the predator gradient
verifies
@gpred qm; s; qð Þ
@qm




@gpred qm; s; qð Þ
@qm




@gpred qm; s; qð Þ
@qm




Thus, high giving-up rates (and shorter stand-offs) for the
predator are advantageous if the prey is abundant, and, viceversa,
low giving-up rates (and longer stand-offs) are better when the
prey is rare. In other words, when the prey density is above the
critical value shpm, finding a new prey is fast relative to waiting out
the stand-off, which, in this scenario, is a waste of time for the
predator.
The above conditions on the sign of the predator gradient can be
reformulated in terms of the singularity s. We check the sign of
Fig. 2. Evolutionary phase planes for m 2 0;1½  and h 2 0;1ð . Dark grey region: non-viability for the resident interior equilibrium. Light grey region: viability and asymptotic
stability for the resident interior equilibrium. White region: unstable resident interior equilibrium and stable limit cycle. Black lines: prey isoclines. Dotted line: predator
isocline. Thick point: the unique singularity. Blue arrows: orbits of the system of canonical equations (lprey sð Þ ¼ 1;r2prey sð Þ ¼ 1;lpred qð Þ ¼ 1;r2pred qð Þ ¼ 1).
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obtain that the predator giving-up rate switches downward evolu-
tion to upward evolution, creating a bang-bang situation, once the
prey strategy passes the singular point s. The singularity s;0ð Þ is
an unstable saddle and the conditions for convergence stability
do not apply here as well as we can exclude evolutionary branch-
ing. Furthermore, the points s;0ð Þ with s > s are (non-isolated)
boundary attractors with respect to s, as they lay on the prey iso-
cline q1.
In Appendix C we prove the main result on the predator gradi-
ent when the resident dynamics is at the interior equilibrium, i.e.
the biological explanation for the directional evolution of the
predator trait. We summarise this with the following Proposition
Proposition 1. In a constant resident population, when s ¼ s, with
s;0ð Þ being the unique singularity, then the expected time till prey
capture for a predator starting in the searching state (ES) is equivalent
to the expected time till prey capture for a predator starting in the6
stand-off state (EP). If s > s, then ES > EP. Finally, if s < s, then
ES < EP.
When the population is cycling, we use standard numerical
methods to compute the invasion fitness and selection gradient.
Specifically we use the procedure NDSolve of the software
Mathematica to numerically integrate the population equations
in (19) and (20) for one prey and one predator. We use the Poincaré
map to evaluate convergence of the solutions. In particular, we col-
lect the data until the distance between x and R xð Þ, with R denoting
the return map, is less than a small error tolerance. The length of
the limit cycle is measured by the time interval between x and
R xð Þ. Finally we numerically integrate the mutant’s growth rate
over the limit cycle as indicated in Eqs. (33) and (34).
We find 10 different configurations for the evolutionary phase
plane with respect to the giving-up rates s and q, which are given
both in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. In Scenario 1–6 we vary the parameter
m 2 0;1½ Þ. We distinguish the areas where the interior equilibrium
Fig. 3. Evolutionary phase planes for m 2 0;1½  and h 2 0;1ð . Dark grey region: non-viability for the resident interior equilibrium. Light grey region: viability and asymptotic
stability for the resident interior equilibrium. White region: unstable resident interior equilibrium and stable limit cycle. Black lines: prey isoclines. Dotted line: predator
isocline. Thick point: the unique singularity. Blue arrows: orbits of the system of canonical equations (lprey sð Þ ¼ 1;r2prey sð Þ ¼ 10;lpred qð Þ ¼ 1;r2pred qð Þ ¼ 1).
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lation attains the predator-free equilibrium), or positive and stable,
or positive and unstable (and the resident population converges to
a stable limit cycle). Note that the extinction boundary never coin-
cides with the Hopf bifurcation line (see the top-right panel which
zooms around the Hopf and transcritical bifurcations and Appen-
dix B). Finally, we give the prey isoclines, the predator isoclines
and the unique singularity. By continuity, the vertical isocline
extends to the region of convergence to the stable limit cycle in
Scenario 2 and 3, as well as the prey isocline q1 ¼ 0 is still present
in the cycling region. Once in the cycling region, the predator iso-
cline is no longer vertical, but its slope is determined by the peri-
odic resident population.
We fix m ¼ 0:5 and we obtain Scenario 7 and 8 by varying the
parameter h 2 0;1ð . In particular, when h ¼ 0, the predator isocline7
in (51) is at infinity, while it becomes feasible for parameter values
greater than 0 (Scenario 8). In Scenario 7, we show that the preda-
tor isocline can also fall on the right hand side of the cycling region
for small values of h.
In the same way, we fix m ¼ 0:01 and we check the dynamics for
different values of h 2 0;1ð . We add Scenario 9 and 10 to the list of
possible evolutionary phase planes: the prey isocline has positive
slope and the predator isocline appears in the region of non-
viability for the interior equilibrium. In Scenario 10 there are no
values for s; qð Þ such that the interior equilibrium is positive and,
therefore, the dynamics only converges to the predator-free
equilibrium.
Note that if m ¼ 1 and the stand-off never occurs, we obtain the
degenerate case where the prey and the predator gradients in (49)
and (50) are zero for every value of s and q. On the other hand,
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prey gradient is zero for every s and q, while the predator gradient
is positive everywhere.
4.2. Evolutionary dynamics: The canonical equation of adaptive
dynamics
We use the canonical equations in (40) and (41) and give the
stream plots of the prey drift kprey s; qð Þ @gprey sm ;qð Þ@sm jsm¼s and the preda-
tor drift kpred s; qð Þ @gpred s;qmð Þ@qm jqm¼q to understand the direction of the
evolution of the traits s and q. In particular, we fix the mutation
probability per birth event lprey sð Þ and lpred qð Þ, and the mutation
variance r2prey sð Þ and r2pred qð Þ (note that for the shape of the orbits
only the relative values matter).
In the cycling region of the s; qð Þ-plane, we plot the drifts of the
canonical equations in (40) and (41) with effective population sizes
in (42) and (43). In particular, this definition forces us to split the
right-hand side of the population equations into explicit birth
and death terms. How to do this is trivial, except for the prey
growth term x 1 xð Þ. One possibility is x 1 xð Þ ¼ 2x x 1þ xð Þ,
with 2x being the birth term and x 1þ xð Þ modelling (density-
independent) natural mortality and (density-dependent) death
due to intraspecific competition between the prey individuals.
Therefore the birth and death per capita rates that we choose for
the numerical analysis are
bprey ¼ 2 ð57Þ
dprey ¼ 1þ xþ
f s;q xð Þ
x
y ð58Þ
bpred ¼ cf s;q xð Þ ð59Þ
dpred ¼ d: ð60Þ
The resulting dynamics is described in Figs. 2 and 3, which dif-
fer in the speed of evolution for the prey trait, r2prey sð Þ.
Note that in Scenario 10 the dynamics converges only to the
predator-free equilibrium and there is no directional evolution.
Furthermore, we do not give the case m ¼ 1, where both selection
gradients are null and so are the drifts. The case h ¼ 0 is also not
displayed: here the prey drift is zero for every s and q (as the prey
gradient is zero) and all the trajectories are vertical and converging
to high levels of q if the prey isocline q2 has negative slope, some of
them converging to the extinction boundary otherwise.
In Scenario 1, 7 and 8 in Fig. 2 the vertical isocline falls on the
right-hand side of the cycling region. The pair of traits s; qð Þ will
approach either the boundary attractors with s > s and q ¼ 0, or
eventually meet the vertical axis s ¼ 0 and evolve towards values
of q  0. In particular, the prey drift is negative everywhere above
the prey isocline q1, while the predator drift changes sign when the
orbits cross the predator isocline. Note that on the isocline q2 the
prey drift is zero, given that the prey gradient @gprey sm ;qð Þ
@sm
jsm¼s ¼ 0.
At the same time, dqdt becomes zero in the region of convergence
to the predator-free equilibrium where the predator effective pop-
ulation size is yE s; qð Þ ¼ 0.
In Scenario 2 and 3 in Fig. 2, the vertical isocline falls into the
region of convergence to the stable limit cycle. Some trajectories
of the evolutionary dynamics enter the cycling region from the
right-hand side of the predator isocline. However, when the popu-
lation is cycling, the predator drift does not change its behaviour,
as it is negative on the right-hand side of the predator isocline,
and positive otherwise.
Till now we have observed two dynamics, which occur depend-
ing on the model parameters and the initial conditions. In terms of
quitting times, convergence to the boundary attractors with s > s
and q ¼ 0 reads like the predator never gives up, and the prey gives
8
up after an exponentially distributed amount of time. Otherwise,
convergence to the vertical axis and high values of q results in
the case when the predator gives up immediately, and the prey
never gives up.
In Scenario 4, 5 and 6 in Fig. 2 we observe a new behaviour
in addition to the ones described above: some trajectories of
the evolutionary dynamics will eventually end into the extinc-
tion boundary, which is here attracting. As the predator density
declines, selection decreases, because of continuity of the fitness
gradient as a function of the environment and the traits s and
q, and, in the absence of the predator, it becomes neutral (i.e.
there is no longer directional selection). The orbits which end
on the extinction boundary become almost horizontal, as dqdt
becomes very small. The points on the prey isocline are also
(non-isolated) attractors for the prey trait s and, as a conse-
quence, the pair of parameter traits stops evolving when it
encounters the isocline.
Finally, in Scenario 9 in Fig. 2, both the prey and the predator
drifts are negative and, as a consequence, directional evolution is
always towards the points with s > s and q ¼ 0.
As directional selection is determined by the relative speeds of
evolution, the extinction boundary is repelling only if its slope is
negative enough compared to the one of the stream lines. When
we increase the speed of evolution of the prey trait s, we observe
that convergence to the extinction boundary becomes a more
likely outcome, as shown in Fig. 3. In other words, a sort of evolu-
tionary murder occurs, since evolution in the s-direction determi-
nes the extinction of the predator species.5. Conclusions
Using the mathematical framework of adaptive dynamics, we
studied the coevolution of the giving-up rates q and s of respec-
tively the predator and the prey in a stand-off situation after a
failed attack. We found three qualitatively different long-term evo-
lutionary outcomes depending on the model parameters as well as
the initial conditions of the strategy dynamics:
(i) the predator gives up immediately (i.e., q ¼ 1), while the
prey never gives up (i.e., s ¼ 0);
(ii) the predator never gives up (i.e., q ¼ 0), while the prey
adopts any giving-up rate greater than or equal to a given
positive threshold value;
(iii) the predator goes extinct. Concerning the transient phase of
the strategy dynamics, we found:
(iv) the giving-up rate s of the prey always decreases unless the
predator has gone extinct or has adopted a giving-up rate
q ¼ 0, in which cases s has become selectively neutral;
(v) the giving-up rate q of the predator decreases for high values
of the giving-up rate s of the prey, but it increases once s has
become less than a given threshold value.
Graphical examples of the various scenarios are given in Figs. 2
and 3. Note that the results in (i) and (ii) are theoretical; in prac-
tice, the prey refuses to give up before the predator gives up in
(i), and similarly for the predator in (ii). Furthermore, these are fast
time-scale processes and the population will not go extinct, as
birth and death happen on the slower time-scale where even an
arbitrarily long time is negligibly short if measured on the slow
time-scale.
The threshold values in (ii) and (v) are the same. For a constant
(i.e., non-cycling) population, we have shown (see Proposition 1)
that if s is equal to this threshold, denoted by s, then the expected
time till the next successful prey capture for a searching predator
and for a predator in a stand-off are exactly the same. For s > s
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searching predator is longer than for a predator in a stand-off,
whereas for s < s the situation is reversed. Therefore, if s > s,
there is a selective advantage for the individual predator to adopt
an even lower giving-up rate, whereas if s < s, then the advantage
is for the individual predator with a higher giving up rate. In other
words, evolution minimises the expected time till the next prey
capture, which is equivalent to maximising the rate of prey cap-
ture, which again is equivalent to maximising the predator’s per
capita birth rate.
The above explains the results in (i), (ii) and (v), at least for a
constant population. The same argument holds for a cycling pop-
ulation as well, except that the threshold value of s is no longer a
constant but depends on the value of q (see Fig. 2, Scenario 1, 2
and 3), and, moreover, that the expected time till the next suc-
cessful prey capture also involves averaging over the population
cycle. Fig. 2 also shows that (i) is the more likely result if the
predator already starts with a high giving-up rate or evolves
slower than the prey, while we get (ii) more often if the prey
starts with a high giving-up rate and the predator evolves faster
than the prey.
The costs or benefits for the prey have a completely different
origin than for the predator. To understand result (iv), we observe
from the invasion fitness of the prey in Eq. (44) that the giving-up
rate sm of the mutant prey affects the invasion fitness of the prey
through the effective capture rate bsm ;q in the numerator of the
predator’s functional response, while the denominator only
depends on the resident strategies. Since bsm ;q is an increasing func-
tion of sm, it is always beneficial for the individual prey to have a
lower giving-up rate. In other words, evolution minimises the
predation-related per capita death rate of the prey, irrespectively
of the resident strategies.
The predator goes extinct if the prey capture rate for a search-
ing predator is higher than for a predator in a stand-off. However,
as we observe in scenarios 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Fig. 2, the predator
cannot take advantage of this, because the giving-up rates of both
the predator and the prey are low, so that the two stay too long
in the stand-off situation. Alternatively, the predator goes extinct
if the prey capture rate in the stand-off is higher than when
searching, but the predator again cannot take advantage of this.
In this case, the giving-up rate of the predator is high, so that
the stand-off is left too early (Fig. 2, scenarios 3, 4, 7 and 8).
Result (iii) happens when an evolutionary trajectory crosses the
extinction boundary in the s; qð Þ-plane. From the direction of
the evolutionary trajectories it can be seen in Fig. 2 that it is
always the evolutionary change in the s-direction, not in the
q-direction, that drives the population over the extinction bound-
ary. It is therefore correct to say that the prey drives the predator
to extinction. It also follows that extinction becomes more likely
if the prey evolves faster than the predator, so that the horizontal
component of the coevolutionary velocity vector becomes domi-
nant (Fig. 3).
In the context of evolutionary game theory, the asymmetric war
of attrition has a continuum of Nash equilibria where one player
quits immediately while the other is prepared to wait any time
at a cost that is not less than the value of the contested object
(Maynard Smith, 1974; Maynard Smith and Parker, 1976; Selten,
1980; Kim, 1993). As a consequence of our model being derived
from individual level interactions with exponentially distributed
event times, quitting after a fixed positive time cannot be
expressed in terms of a constant giving up rate. In that sense, the
Nash equilibria of the war of attrition in game theory cannot be
reproduced here. At most we can express evolutionary outcomes
in terms of average giving-up times, which are the reciprocal of
the corresponding giving-up rates. With that in mind, only result9
(i) is similar to the Nash equilibria of the asymmetric war of
attrition.
All other results are enigmatic for the present model. Result (ii)
is the opposite of the Nash equilibrium: one player never gives up
(as apposed to immediately giving up), while the other player can
adopt any giving-up rate greater than a given threshold rate, which
is the same as having an average giving-up time that is less than
(as opposed to greater than) a given positive threshold time.
Results (iii), (iv) and (v) are about (or a direct consequence of)
strategy dynamics by selection and small mutation steps and
dependence on initial conditions. This is the realm of the adaptive
dynamics approach and such results cannot be reproduced by a
game theoretical analysis because of its focus on evolutionary sta-
bility and Nash equilibria.
While our results differ from the asymmetric war of attrition
game partly because of the chosen methods of analysis, more
important, however, is the difference in modelling approaches.
The war of attrition is formulated without ecological context, and
the costs and benefits for the players are predetermined given their
respective strategies. Embedding the game in a population dynam-
ical model such as the replicator equation by Hofbauer and Sigmund
(2003) does not add any new ecology. In contrast, our model is
derived from a network of individual-level interactions and pro-
cesses including the formation and break-up of a predator–prey
pair engaged in the mutual stand-off. As a consequence, the evolu-
tionary game is an integral part of the full ecology and the preda-
tor–prey dynamics. The costs and benefits of different strategies
are implicit and emerge from the dynamics rather than being pre-
determined. Only after the model was formulated and analysed, it
emerged that the costs and benefits for the predator can be mea-
sured in terms of the per capita birth rate, while for the prey they
are measured in terms of the per capita death rate due to predation.
This may seem obvious, but only so in retrospect, after the model
has been formulated and analysed. And as seen above, the results
are not the same.
Note that the time scale separation is another crucial step in
our modelling approach. By the singular perturbation theory, we
obtain qualitatively similar results if we relax the assumptions
of time scale separation a little bit. By relaxing the time scale
separation assumptions even further, the system becomes
multi-dimensional and has potentially more complex dynamics,
including chaotic behaviour and multiple attractors. In this sce-
nario, we do not know to what extent our conclusions still
apply.
An interesting and quite natural extension of the model would
include the possibility that the stand-off escalates into a fight
where both the predator and the prey may get injured. The costs
and benefits of different giving-up times then would not only
come from changes in the per capita birth rates (in case of the
predator) and predation-related death rates (in case of the prey)
as in the present model, but also from the effects of injury on
the fecundity and mortality rates of both the predator and the
prey. Although it is not obvious how the interaction between
the stand-offs and the escalated fights would affect the evolution-
ary outcomes, using our modelling approach (from individual-
level processes to population dynamics) makes the evolutionary
problem easy to formulate and straightforward to analyse with
the adaptive dynamics framework.
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Appendix A. On the time-scale separation for the ecological
dynamics






































































¼ cyHj dyj ðA:6Þ
with the conservation laws in (5) and (6).
We separate the dynamics into two time-scales by introducing
the small and dimensionless scaling parameter e > 0 : ySj ¼ e~ySj ;
yHj ¼ e~yHj ; yj ¼ e~yj; Pij ¼ eP

ij; p ¼ e1~p; qj ¼ e1~qj; si ¼ e1~si;h ¼ e~h.









































































¼ c~yHj d~yj: ðA:12Þ
We introduce the short time ~t ¼ e1t, let e ! 0 and drop the









































We use the conservation law for the total predator density to
reduce the equations for ySj ; y
H
j and Pij to only two equations and
we set xFi ¼ xi. We obtain the equations for the quasi-equilibrium
















0¼ 1mð ÞpxiySj  qjþ si
 
Pij: ðA:20Þ
We conclude that the system has a unique quasi-equilibrium of
the fast dynamics,
xFi ¼ xi; ðA:21Þ
ySj ¼
yj





þh 1hð ÞPi0 si0 xi0qjþsi0
h i ; ðA:22Þ
Pij ¼
1mð Þ pqjþsi xiyj





þh 1hð ÞPi0 si0 xi0qjþsi0
h i ; ðA:23Þ




When the denominator of (A.22) and (A.23) is positive, then the
quasi-equilibrium is feasible, i.e. exists and is positive. Further-
more we use linear stability analysis to check the stability condi-
tions. The elements of the Jacobian matrix corresponding to the
fast system of equations in (A.19) and (A.20) are constant and do
not depend on the equilibrium, thus computing the trace and
determinant and their signs is straightforward. We conclude that
under the feasibility condition, the trace and determinant are
respectively negative and positive, hence the quasi-equilibrium is
hyperbolically stable. To prove global stability we use the
Poincaré-Bendixon theorem and the Bendixon-Dulac theorem.
We can exclude the existence of a limit cycle, because the trace
is negative everywhere. Furthermore, since there is only one equi-
librium, it must be the x-limit of every orbit of the fast dynamics.
Appendix B. On the equilibrium for the ecological dynamics
We consider the differential equations in (19) and (20) for a sin-
gle prey x and a single predator y with strategies respectively s and
q and bs;q and hs;q as defined for (13),
_x ¼ x 1 xð Þ  bs;qx
1þ bs;qhs;qx
; ðB:1Þ
_y ¼ c bs;qxy
1þ bs;qhs;qx
 dy: ðB:2Þ
The prey zero-growth and predator zero-growth isoclines (see
Fig. 1) are
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y ¼ 1xð Þ 1þhs;qbs;qxð Þbs;q ¼




bs;q cdhs;qð Þ ¼
¼ d qþsð Þpd hqmhs hþmmhð Þþm1½ þpc mqþs hþmmhð Þ½  :
ðB:6Þ
The full expressions for interior equilibrium in (21) is
x̂ ¼ d qþ sð Þ
pd hqm hs hþ m mhð Þ þ m 1½  þ pc mqþ s hþ m mhð Þ½  ; ðB:7Þ
ŷ ¼ qþ sð Þpc
2 qmþ s hþ m hmð Þ½   qþ sð Þdc qþ sþ p pmþ pqmþ ps hþ m hmð Þ½ 
p2 qmcþ sc hþ m hmð Þ  dþ dm hdqm hds hþ m hmð Þ½ 2
:
ðB:8Þ
The equilibrium is viable if c > dh and one of the following sets
of conditions for p; s and q holds
d
cdhð Þ hþmhmð Þ < p <
d
cdhð Þm ;
s > dp 1mð Þdhhmphdhpdhmpdchmpþchpþcmp ;




c dhð Þm ; s >
dp 1 mð Þ
dhhmp hdhp dhmp d chmpþ chpþ cmp ; q > 0;
ðB:10Þ
or
p > dcdhð Þm ; 0 < s <
dp 1mð Þ
ddhphþpchdhpmþpcmþdphmpchm ;





c dhð Þm ; s P
dp 1 mð Þ
d dhphþ pch dhpmþ pcmþ dphm pchm ; q > 0:
ðB:12Þ
Therefore in the positive quadrant of the s; qð Þ-plane, the inte-
rior equilibrium exists and is positive for values of s; qð Þ on the
right-hand side of the extinction boundary
q ¼ dp m1hs hþmhmð Þ½ dsþcps hþmhmð Þdhmpþdcmp , which intersects the s-axis at
s ¼ d 1mð Þpp cdhð Þ hþmhmð Þd (see Figs. 2 and 3) for different configurations).
A transcritical bifurcation occurs on the extinction boundary: for
values of s; qð Þ on the left-hand side of the line, the interior equilib-
rium is no longer present and the dynamics converges to the
predator-free equilibrium.
The determinant and the trace of the community matrix
J x; yð Þjx¼x̂;y¼ŷ for the ecological dynamics determine the stability of
the equilibrium:
det J x; yð Þjx¼x̂;y¼ŷ ¼ d 2x̂ 1ð Þ 





trJ x; yð Þjx¼x̂;y¼ŷ ¼ 1 d 2x̂þ
bs;q cx̂ ŷþ chs;qbs;qx̂2
 
1þ hs;qbs;qx̂
 2 : ðB:14Þ
A Hopf bifurcation occurs when the trace evaluated at the inte-
rior equilibrium is zero. In order to verify that the Hopf bifurcation
do not coincide with the transcritical bifurcation, we look at the
s; qð Þ-planes in Figs. 2 and 3: it is enough to check that the two
curves cannot intersect with the s-axis in the same point. By solv-
ing for different parameters the equation for the intersection11points of, respectively, the Hopf bifurcation line and the extinction
border with the axis q ¼ 0, we obtain that under no conditions on
the parameter values the two bifurcations coincide.
Appendix C. On the sign of the predator gradient
In this Section we discuss the proof of Proposition 1. The condi-
tion x̂ ¼ shpm in (55) is equivalent to mpx̂ð Þ
1 ¼ hsð Þ1 and compares
the rate of the two events modelling successful prey capture by
the predator (here given in the form of monomolecular reactions
with a constant or prey density-dependent transition rate) with
xF ¼ x at the fast time equilibrium.
In particular, let’s define with ES the expected time till prey cap-
ture for a predator starting in state yS and with EP the expected
time till prey capture for a predator starting in state P. Then, fol-




þ 1 mð Þpx
mpxþ 1 mð Þpx EP; ðC:1Þ
EP ¼ 1
qþ sþ
qþ 1 hð Þs
qþ s ES: ðC:2Þ
Solutions for ES and EP are
ES ¼ qþ sþ px 1 mð Þ
px qmþ s hþ m hmð Þ½  ; ðC:3Þ
EP ¼ qþ sþ px hs
px qmþ s hþ m hmð Þ½  ; ðC:4Þ
the comparison of the two (ES ¼ EP) leads to condition (55). As
x̂ ¼ shpm can be reformulated in terms of s, we conclude that if
s ¼ s, then ES ¼ EP. In the same way, starting from the conditions
in (54) and (56), we get that if s > s, then ES > EP, and if s < s, then
ES < EP.Appendix D. On the canonical equation and different
definitions of stability
We recall the canonical equations in (40) and (41). For the pur-
pose of this study, below we only give conditions for stability of a
singularity in the monomorphic resident population and we
assume that the coefficients ki s; qð Þ; i ¼ prey; pred are differentiable.
We can define an evolutionary attractor by analysing the trace and
determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the evolutionary dynamics
in (40) and (41) evaluated at the singularity. The elements of
J s; qð Þjs¼s ;q¼q are
J11 ¼ kprey s; qð Þ
@2gprey sm; qð Þ
@s2m
þ @
2gprey sm; qð Þ
@s@sm
 !
¼ kprey s; qð ÞA11;
ðD:1Þ
J12 ¼ kprey s; qð Þ
@2gprey sm; qð Þ
@sm@q
¼ kprey s; qð ÞA12; ðD:2Þ
J21 ¼ kpred s; qð Þ
@2gpred s; qmð Þ
@qm@s
¼ kpred s; qð ÞA21; ðD:3Þ
J22 ¼ kpred s; qð Þ
@2gpred s; qmð Þ
@q2m
þ @
2gpred s; qmð Þ
@q@qm
 !
¼ kpred s; qð ÞA22:
ðD:4Þ
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singular coalition of one-dimensional traits) is convergence stable if
det Jð Þ > 0 and tr Jð Þ < 0. A singularity s; qð Þ is weakly convergence
stable if there exist a given strictly positive diagonal matrix with
diagonal entries ki s; qð Þ > 0; i ¼ prey; pred such that
kprey s; qð ÞA11 þ kpred s; qð ÞA22 < 0; ðD:5Þ
A11A22 > A12A21: ðD:6Þ
For the present model, we have weak stability if and only if
A11 < 0 _A22 < 0; ðD:7Þ
A11A22 > A12A21; ðD:8Þ
as we suppose either kprey s; qð Þ or kpred s; qð Þ large enough to make the
other term in (D.5) negligible. Strong convergence stability is
obtained for any strictly positive diagonal matrix with diagonal
entries ki s; qð Þ > 0; i ¼ prey;pred and
A11 < 0; A22 < 0; ðD:9Þ
A11A22 > A12A21: ðD:10Þ
Note that strong convergence stability implies weakly conver-
gence stability. Furthermore, we define a strategy s; qð Þ totally
stable if it is stable for the differential inclusions
0 6 d
dt
s sð Þ A11 s sð Þ þA12 q qð Þð Þ; ðD:11Þ
0 6 d
dt
q qð Þ A21 s sð Þ þA22 q qð Þð Þ: ðD:12Þ
In particular, s; qð Þ is totally stable if
A11 < 0; A22 < 0; ðD:13Þ
A11A22 > A12A21j j ðD:14Þ
and total stability implies strong stability of the singular strategy
(see also Matessi and Di Pasquale, 1996).
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